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Grice (1990), in his Cooperative Principle, proposes 
that speakers engaged in discourse may assume mutually 
cooperative truth. Yet, in daily discourse, we observe 
occasions in which speakers of English seemingly attempt to 
avoid absolute commitment to the propositional truth in 
their speech. In this context, I propose that speakers of 
English intend to avoid absolute commitment through their 
use of modality. 
After defining speaker commitment as it pertains to 
propositional truth in speech acts and exploring influences· 
and motivations that may affect speaker commitment, this 
thesis will introduce and define modality in the context of 
actual speech. The scope of modality will then be narrowed 
to a focus on core and periphrastic modals. Specifically, 
discussion of these modals will include their 
identification and meanings/functions. Finally, a survey 
.of commitment and truth in commo·n modal usage will be 
presented. The survey's findings will particularly address 
the following questions: Do speakers express absolute 
commitment through modal usage? What modals do speakers 
perceive to convey the strongest and weakest 
iii 
degrees/meanings of commitment? Do speakers prefer the 
directness of the positive assertion can or the distant, 
albeit polite form could when speaking commitment? Does 
the usage of can versus could change the degree/meaning of 
commitment in speech? How do speakers' perceptions of 
commitment through the use of the modal will relate to 
relationships between speakers and hearers? Are age, 
gender, native language, and/or occupation relational to 
the degree and/or propositional truth of commitment in 
speech? Is the speaker's perception of his/her level of 
commitments consistent with or variant to the speaker's 
reported actual keeping of commitments? Lastly, is the 
phrasal modal need to spoken consistently in daily 
discourse to mean literally necessity? Following survey 
Findings and Summary, a Discussion of General and Teaching 
~ 
English as a Second Language implications is presented. 
Key words: commitment, modality, relationship, gender, age, 
native language, and statistics. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
COMMITMENT IN SPEECH ACTS 
When we speak or write, we are rarely 
very clear, precise, or explicit about 
what we mea~.but are, on the contrary, 
vague, indirect, and unclear about 
just what we are committed to. 
(Stubbs, 1986, p.1) 
Introduction 
The axiom "A man is as good as his word" and the 
Biblical admonition "Let your yea be yea, and your nea, 
nea" (James 5:12) traditionally have been common principles 
governing daily English conversation. Accordingly, Grice 
(1990), in his Cooperative Principle, proposes that 
speakers engaged in discourse may assume mutually 
cooperative truth. Yet, in daily discourse, we observe 
occasions in which speakers of English seemingly attempt to 
avoid absolute commitment to the propositional truth in 
their speech. Consider the following examples of actual 
speech. On December 12, 2001 (5:00 PM), Peter Jennings 
presaged his evening topic for ABC's World News Tonight, 
"Tanzanite, the popular gem that may be funding terrorism." 
Effectively, Jennings implies to his audience a plausible 
link between tanzanite and terrorism without committing 
1 
himself to the truth of an actual link. Similarly, in a 
conversation between two musicians, Musician A apprises her 
colleague (B), "Practice is Saturday morning at 9:00, but 
don't quote me." Thus, Musician A overtly states that 
practice is scheduled for 9:00 AM, while seemingly 
attempting to elude commitment to the truth of a 9:00 AM 
practice by adding to her statement "but don't quote me." 
In yet a third example, a middle-aged lady ·(c) tells a 
friend, "I will be there (a friend's birthday 
celebr~tion) ." Not long after, (C) tells a co-worker that 
she will be going to the birthday party (referenced above) 
unless she can get tickets to a concert, which is the same 
night as the party. Upon contemplation of these given 
examples, I set forth two questions: if, as in the first 
two examples, we as speakers of English (SsE) circumvent 
commitment to propositional truth in our speech, do we 
genuinely practice speaking cooperatively in mutual 
commitment to trvth? Further, if, as in the third example, 
we speak commitment, but do not intend commitment, do we 
subtly lie? 
In this context, I propose that speakers of English 
intend to avoid absolute commitment in their use of 
modality. Further, 1) I will specifically demonstrate that 
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speakers of English use will, the modal to which "absolute 
commitment" is ascribed in linguistic theory, for an 
intended meaning of relative commitment; moreover, 
sociocultural variables such as speaker-addressee 
relationship and age significantly impact speaker 
commitment in his/her speech acts. 2) I will investigate 
how speakers apply modality in order to distance themselves 
from an absolute commitment to the verity of their speech. 
Within this first chapter, I will def_in~ speaker 
commitment as it directly relates to propositional 
truthfulness in speech acts and progress to a discussion of 
pragmatic and sociolinguistic factors that may influence a 
speaker's commitment in his/her speech acts. 
In chapter 2, modality will be introduced and defined 
in the context of actual speech surrounding the 2000 
Presidential Election. The scope of modality will then be 
narrowed to the identification and function/meaning of core 
and periphrastic modals. The discussion will present 
current grammar and research theory that asserts absolute 
poles of commitment in modal usage. 
Chapter 3 will present the results of a survey of 
commitment and truth in common modal usage obtained by 
sampling in a variety of contexts will be presented. The 
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survey's findings will particularly address the following 
questions: Do speakers express absolute commitment through 
modal usage? What modals do speakers perceive to convey 
the strongest and weakest degrees/meanings of commitment? 
Do speakers prefer the directness of the positive assertion 
can or the distant, albeit polite form could when speaking 
commitment? Does the usage of can versus could change the 
degree/meaning of commitment in speech? How do speakers' 
perceptions of commitment through the use of the modal will 
relate to relationships between speakers and hearers? Are 
age, gender, native language, and/or occupation relational 
to the degree and/or propositional truth of commitment in 
speech? Are speakers' perceptions of their level of 
commitments consistent with or variant to their reported 
actual keeping of commitments? Secondarily, to investigate 
propositional truth in modal usage, I ask, is the phrasal 
modal need to spoken consistently in daily discourse to 
mean literally necessity? 
Commitment 
A discussion of commitment in speech acts would be 
remiss without careful definition and pragmatic examination 
of commitment as it pertains to propositional truthfulness 
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in speech acts. Therefore, I posit and strive to answer 
the following: What is commitment? What constitutes 
commitment in speech acts? What pragmatic and 
sociolinguistic factors influence a speaker's commitment to 
truth in his/her speech? Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1959) defines commitment as "a promise or 
pledge" (p. 166). The American Heritage Dictionary (1997) 
further explicates that commitment, in addition to a 
pledge, is "the state of being bound emotionally or 
intellectually... " (p. 281). Moreover, Webster's Collegiate 
Thesaurus (1988) assigns "obligation" (p. 141) as the 
primary synonym to commitment. Thus, by definition, 
commitment includes a promise or pledge, and as such, is 
binding as an obligation. Further, commitment, as a 
promise, "gi~es to the person to whom it is made a right to 
expect or to claim" that which is promised (Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary, 1959, p. 676). By extending this 
definition into speech act theory, I submit that speaker 
commitment may be defined as a speaker's promise to the 
propositional truth of his/her utterance, the promise to 
which the speaker is emotionally or intellectually bound 
and obligated in his/her speech. Thereby, the addressee 
expects or claims that the proposition(s) of the speaker's 
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utterance(s) is true. Comparatively, Grice (1990) proposes 
that rational conversation requires three cooperative 
elements: co-operative effort(s), common purpose(s), and 
mutually accepted direction between speaker(s) and 
hearer(s) (p. 27). Under the umb_rella of this· Co-operative 
Principle, Grice, moreover, asserts a maxim of Quality, 
"Try to make your contribution one that is true...Do not say 
what you believe to be false" and "Do not say that for 
which you lack adequate evidence" (p. 28). Thus, co­
operative speakers of English engaged in rational 
conversation expect mutually co-operative truth; i.e., 
speaker commitment to the propositional truth in his/her 
speech. In stark contrast, Aristotle defines the 
antithesis of commitment to truth, i.e., a lie, as "a 
statement of that which is that it is not, or of that which 
is not that it is" (Washington, 1991, p. 28). Citing Frege 
(1981), Lyon observes diametric.antagonists, truth versus 
lies, in daily conversation and asserts that our words and 
sentences relate "to truth or falsity, rather than to 
situations that they purport to describe" (p. 161). 
Further, Lyon (1981) writes that commitment is "a modal 
component of factuality versus desirability" (p. 191). 
However, in pragmatic observation of daily conversation, is 
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speaker commitment merely an utterance of truth or falsity? 
Factuality or desirability? What constitutes speaker 
commitment in our speech acts? 
Speaker commitment may be expressed through two 
primary means. First, and most obviously, speaker 
commitment may be expressed through the illocutiona_ry act 
of making a promise. How does a speaker accomplish. this 
act? Searle (1965) posits that all speech acts are 
governed by constitutive and regulative rules. The former 
is a system of semantic rules under which speech acts are 
performed in the form of "If Xr then y;" the latter, 
resembling the equation "X counts as y," regulates existing 
forms of behavior and interpersonal relationships (p. 117) 
The speech act of making a promise creates an obligation 
under regulative rules in the form of X counts as y, i.e., 
certain conditions must obtain. Searle proposes the 
following requisites for making a sincere promise. 
1. Input and Output. "Normal input and output 
conditions obtainff (p. 121), i.e., the utterance must 
be intelligible speaker output and understood hearer 
input. 
2. Propositional Content. "S (the speaker) expresses 
that p (the proposition) in the utterance of T (the 
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sentence)," and "in expressing that p, S predicates a 
future act A of S" (p. 121). 
3. Preparatory Conditions. "H (the hearer) would 
prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes 
H would prefer his doing A to his not doing A. 
Additionally, "It is not obvious to both S and H that 
Swill do A in the normal course of events" (p. 122). 
4. Sincerity Condition. "S intends to do A" (p. 
123) . 
5. Essential Condition. "S intends that the utterance 
of Twill place him under an obligation to do A" (p. 
123) . 
6. Explication. "S intends that the utterance of T 
will produce in Ha belief that conditions (sincerity 
and essential) obtain by means of the recognition of 
the intention to produce that belief, and he intends 
this recognition to be achieved by means of the 
recognition of the sentence as one conventionally used 
to preface such beliefs" (p. 123). 
7. Semantic Rules. "The semantical rules of the 
dialect spoken by Sand Hare such that Tis correctly 
and sincerely uttered if and only if (all previous) 
conditions obtain (p. 123). 
8 
Of the afore conditions, condition #4 qualifies such 
promises as sincere. However, we observe in daily English 
conversation occasions in which an insincere promise is 
uttered, i.e., the speaker does not intend to do A. For 
example, S affirms to H, "I promise I will be there (H's 
party) tomorrow," although, S has other plans and does not 
intend to go to the party. In such occurrences, does S's 
insincerity void the uttered commitment? It does not. 
In addition to the act of making a sincere promise, 
speakers of English also make a promise or commitment to 
the truth of their speech by the mere utterance of their 
words, regardless of the speaker's sincerity or 
insincerity, i.e., the very illocution of an utterance 
obligates the speaker to his/her speech (exception: irony, 
implicature, sarcasm, metaphors, and the like-See Grice, 
1990). Searle (1965) asserts: 
To say "I promise to do A~ is to take responsibility 
for intending to do A, and this condition holqs 
whether the utterance was sincere or insincere (p. 
124) . 
Stubbs (1986; cf. Kempson 1977) likewise writes, 
Performatives (e.g. I promise, I guarantee) can be 
analyzed naturally as reporting propositions, which 
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I are true by virtue of being uttered. If I say that 
have promised, even if I have no intention of keeping 
my promise: the commitment has been made (p. 18). 
Moreover, Grice's Co-operative Principle and maxim of 
Quality may be extended such that the theory of a speaker's 
obligation to the truth of his/her speech by mere utterance 
applies not only to performative speech acts, but to non­
performative speech acts as well; if I say that pis or is 
not, even if I do not believe that it is or is not, I have 
verbally made a commitment to the propositional truth in my 
speech by virtue of its utterance. Consider the following: 
1) I promise I will come. 
2) I will come. 
3) I promise the package was mailed yesterday. 
4) The package was mailed yesterday. 
5) I guarantee rehearsal is at 8:00 PM. 
6) Rehearsal is at 8:00 PM. 
Although the illocutionary force, by use of performatives 
in sentences #1, 3, and 5 above, is stronger than that of 
sentences #2, 4, and 6; under the Co-operative Principle 
and the maxim of Quality, the speaker is obligated to utter 
only that which he/she believes to be true and the hearer 
expects that the speaker's utterance is true in all six 
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examples, regardless whether the speaker utters 
performative or non-performative verbs. Thus, we observe 
that the act of mere utterance obligates, or promises, the 
speaker's commitment to his/her speech. Further, drawing 
upon Searle, I submit that when a speaker utters T 
containing that p, and thereby promises to the truth of the 
speech act, the following conditions obtain regulatively in 
the form of X counts as y. 
1. Input and Output. "Normal input and output conditions 
obtain" (Searle, 1965, p. 121), i.e., the utterance is 
intelligible speaker output and understood hearer 
input. 
2. Propositional Content. "S (the speaker) expresses 
that p (the proposition) in the utterance of T (the 
sentence) , " and "in expressing that p, S predicates... " 
p (Searle, 1965, p. 121). 
3. Preparatory Condition. H does not have reason to 
believe that Sis speaking uncooperatively or 
untruthfully. 
4. Sincerity Condition. S does not intend that p to be 
implicature, figure of speech, · indir.ect speech, or the 
like. 
11 
5. Essential Condition. Under the maxim of Quality, S's 
utterance of that pin T obligates S to the truth of 
his/her speech, regardless whether S intends that pas 
truth or not. 
6. Explication. S utters that pin T; such utterance of 
T produces in H the belief that S intends his/her 
speech to be cooperative and truthful, and therefore, 
also produces in H the belief that Sis committed to 
the truth of his/her speech. S's utterance Tis a 
sentence conventionally used to convey T as truth, 
thereby leading H to expect S's utterance to be true. 
7. Semantic Rules. The semantic rules of the language or 
dialect spoken by Sand Hare such that T uttered is a 
speaker's promise to the truth of T if the previous 
conditions obtain. 
Thus, in accordance with the Co-operative Principle, 
its supermaxims, and regulative rules which govern speech 
acts, I conclude that a speaker of English pledges 
commitment through two observed means: 1) 'the 
performative act of making a promise and 2) the mere 
utterance of non-performative T that P. Reciprocally, 
the addressee expects spe.aker commitment when either 
illocutor mean has been uttered. 
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Influences and Motivations 
Having defined speaker commitment as it pertains to 
propositional truth, and having examined the conditions 
that constitute such commitment, we turn our attention to 
explore influences and motivations that may be related to 
speaker commitment in our speech acts. Sociolinguistically, 
why might speakers endeavor to circumvent commitment in 
their speech and to its truth? Pragmatically, upon what 
occasion(s) and under what circumstance(s) do illocutors 
intend to elude speaker commitment? ·what might be achieved 
or gained when ct speaker avoids commitment in his/her 
speech? 
First, the compelling consideration of politeness may 
be observed in daily English conversation. Chen (2001) 
proposes, "Politeness is a factor that determines what a 
speaker says and how she says it" (p. 95). Moreover, Brown 
and Levinson (1987), assert that speakers employ 
"linguistic stLategies" to "face-oriented ends," i.e., 
politeness (p. 58). 
Of politeness, Leech (1983) posits two forms of 
illocution: self-politeness (a speaker's politeness toward 
himself/herself) and other-politeness (a speaker's 
politeness toward the hearer). Additionally, the theorist 
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notes that politeness may be expressed toward a third party 
(present or absent) as an extension of self or other. 
Whether the third party is perceived as an extension of 
self or other is culturally relative; i.e., constrained by 
cultural expectations and norms of language. Moreover, 
cultural expectations influence the manner of expressing 
politeness, including esteem versus denigration. For 
example, an English-speaking host may graciously accept a 
compliment on a deliciously cooked meal with a "Thank You." 
However, a Chinese Mandarin speaking host must not only 
humbly decline the compliment, but also demonstrate 
politeness by denigrating the quality of the meal (viewed 
culturally as an extension of self) with a response such as 
It's not so good or It's nothing. In this case, the latter 
host may or may not be committed to his/her speech of 
politeness, inwardly knowing that a very generous, 
extraordinarily delicious meal indeed was served and being 
.. 
most appreciative of the compliment. 
Contemporary with Leech, Brown and Levinson (1987) 
observe that politeness is contingent upon two elements: 
rationality and face, specifically other-face, i.e., the 
face of the hearer. Rationality is defined as that 
"precisely definable mode of reasoning from ends to the 
14 
means that will achieve those ends" (p. 58). Face relates 
both to the positive desire of a person to be accepted and 
approved of in specific communicative, social situations as 
well as to a person's negative desire to be unimpeded, 
which includes "the basic claim to territories, personal 
preserves, rights to non-distraction - i.e., to freedom of 
action and freedom from imposition" (p. 61). Moreover, 
Brown and Levinson emphasize: "Face is something that is 
emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or 
enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in 
interaction" (p. 61) . Thus, face is an "high stakes" 
politeness component, which greatly influences the content 
of a speaker's utterance as well as the manner in which 
propositional content is illocuted, including commitment 
versus non-commitment. 
However, in daily conversation,. we frequently ·observe 
,. ' 
occasions in which a speaker imposes upon his/her hearer's 
face by uttering a Face-Threatening Act (FTA). For 
example, a family member's car is in the shop. I live 
nearby; consequently, this family member asks, 
Would you give me a ride to work tomorrow morning? 
Her request, though seemingly reasonable, imposes her 
desire or need upon me, thereby threatening my negative 
15 
face and potentially impeding my plan to leave early in the 
morning for San Diego. 
In addition to a speaker's having potential to 
threaten the face of the hearer (other-face), Chen (2001) 
observes that the reciprocal also holds true, i.e. the 
hearer potentially can threaten the face of the speaker or 
self-face can be threatened. Thus, Chen proposes (in 
polite modesty), an essential complement to Levinson and 
Brown's other-politeness, the theory of self-politeness: 
"When having to do speech acts that threaten self-face or 
when self-face is attacked by others, speakers will make 
efforts to maintain, protect, or enhance self-face, 
resulting in utterances for the sake of self-politeness." 
(p. 90) In this context, self is defined as the speaker and 
those with whom the speaker is associated. [e.g., A 
teacher is one entity among the plurality of aids, fellow 
colleagues, and administrators of a learning institution; 
therefore, a teacher's associates and colleagues, as well 
as the institution itself, may be included in that 
teacher's concept of "self."] _Speech acts that threaten 
self-face (positive or negative) are known as Self-Face 
Threatening Acts (SFTA's). Consider the following example. 
A high school principal asks, 
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Will you (an English teacher) consider giving extra 
time after school next semester to tutor students in 
English and math? 
However, the teacher has been looking forward to taking 
piano lessons during that time. A response in the 
negative, i.e., I do not agree to commit, would be 
potentially self-face threatening; for it might contribute· 
to the principal's perceiving the teacher as being non­
cooperative or a non-team player (positive self-face 
threatening). On the other hand, an utterance to commit to 
tutoring after school would require that the teacher give 
up treasured personal time and plans to study music 
(negative self-face threatening). 
To further explicate their politeness theories, Brown 
and Levinson (1987, p.60) and Chen (2001, p.96) assert that 
speakers employ superstrategies of politeness to determine 
1) whether or not they will utter a face-threatening act at 
all, and if so, 2) the content and manner in which they 
will illocute the speech act. Table 1.1 below explicates. 
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Tab·le 1.1. Politeness Superstrategies 
Brown and Levinson 
(Relevance: S asks H for 
commitment in speech act.) 
Less Face Threat 
1. Baldly. Without redress. 
On record. 
2. Positive politeness. 
With redress. On record. 
3. Negative politeness. 
With redress. On record. 
4. Off record. 
5. Withhold FTA. 
Great Face Threat 
Superstrategy determined by 
estimation of: 
1. The want to communicate the 
content of FTA x. 
2. The want to be efficient/urgent. 
3. The want to maintain Hearer's 
face to any degree. 
(Brown and Levinson, 1987) 
Chen 
(Relevance: S makes a choice: 
to commit or not in speech act.) 
Less Face Threat 
1. Baldly. Without redress. 
On record. 
2. *With redress. On record. 
3. Off record. 
4. Withhold SFTA. 
Great Face Threat 
Superstrategy determined by· 
estimation of: 
1. Degree self-face is threa~ened 
by other. 
A. Degree of confrontation 
(continuum) . 
B. Gravity of FTA threat by 
other. 
1) FTA Severity. 
2) FTA Directness. 
2. Degree self-face threatened by 
SFTA. 
A. SFTA Severity. 
B. SFTA Consequence. 
(Chen, 2001) 
(*Chen does not distinguish between negative and positive face, a 
distinction of kind, rather than degree. Additionally, Chen notes that 
negative and positive face apply to all superstrategies whether on or 
off record. ) 
In Table 1.1 above, we observe that the superstrategies for 
other and self-politeness are complementary. In situations 
which speakers perceive to be non-confrontational or 
minimally consequential, speakers may choose to utter 
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"baldly" FTA's or SFTA's; e.g. a congenial, "Excuse me," 
(SFTA) or a simple request/reply: 
A: When you get a moment, could you lend me a quick 
hand? (FTA) 
B: I'd be happy to. (SFTA) 
From·the latter example, we note specifically that B's 
speech act is a baldly uttered commitment to help A. 
In a situation of slightly increased potential for 
face threat, speakers may choose to utter FTA's or SFTA's 
"with redress" in an attempt to mitigate unfavorable and 
unwanted positive or negative-face results. Chen suggests 
that such redress may include, but not be limited to, the 
following: justification, contradiction, hedging, 
impersonalization, humor, confident speech, modest speech, 
hesitance, or conditions appended to the SFTA to the 
utterance (p. 99). [Note: All but direct contradiction 
may apply to an FTA.] Specific to SFTA's, Chen notes that 
the first five speaker options (justification, 
contradiction, hedging, impersonalization, and humor) are 
positive strategies employed usually when a speaker has 
acted thoughtlessly or committed a faux pas. In such 
utterances a speaker will admit to the offence, adding to 
the admission justification, a humorous remark, etc. When 
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needing to portray a strong, capable self-image, such as at 
a job interview, the speaker attempts to use speech that 
suggests self-confidence. On the other hand, a speaker who 
does not want to seem arrogant (which also might be 
perceived as a threat to other--a potential for other 
attack against self) may choose to modestly minimize 
himself/herself. Hesitation and conditional addendums are 
negative strategies used by a speaker (self) when other 
imposes upon self, such that self would potentially lose 
self-face or realize unfavorable consequences should self 
not agree to the imposition, e.g. a university 
administrator strongly urges a professor of English to 
speak at a CATESOL conference forum, rather than to attend 
a long anticipated L.A. Laker's game. In r.esponse, the 
professor may hedge or hesitate to commit to speaking at 
the conference, or the professor may commit on the 
condition "If my job depends on it, I will do it" or "Only 
if no one else is available will I do it." 
Of particular relevance to the present thesis, each of 
the previous nine options of Chen's second superstrategy 
are particularly applicable to commitment in speech acts. 









We're sorry that it's taking a 
little longer than expected. We 
will have it finished by 5:00; 
we've just been swamped today. 
I said that I would go, but I 
really didn't commit to it. 
We will probably go to the game. 
Boss: Will you please see that 
this project gets done 
correctly? 
Employee: It will be tough to meet 
these specifications. 
Supervisor: Can you fix it? 
Worker: Did Greenbay win the 
Superbowl? 
I will take care of the matter; I 
know the client well. 
Student: I don't understand 
this concept. 
Can you help me? 
Tutor: I might know a little 
about it. 
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Hesitation: I have a 9:00 and a 10:00 
(appointment); I'll see if I can 
swing by about 11:30. 
Conditions: Parent: It's time to do your 
homework. 
Child: I'll do it only because 
I have to. 
Upon occasions in which the threat to face is high, 
speakers may opt to employ a third super strategy, that is, 
to utter FTA's or SFTA's "off-record" or to be elusive on-
record. As a primary means of doing so, Chen asserts that 
speakers strive to implement implicature and other implied 
speech, flouting Grice's maxims of Quantity, Quality, 
Relation, and/or Manner. The purpose, Chen writes, "is 
obvious: by doing the SFTA at the what-is-implied level 
rather than at the what-is-said level, the speaker would 
avoid damaging self-face" (p. 101). 
Additionally, as the degree of threat to face 
increases, I propose that speakers specifically use 
modality as a means to circumvent commitment in their 
implied speech. Peter Jennings' statement, "Tanzanite, the 
popular gem that may be funding terrorism," (quoted in this 
paper's opening paragraph) illustrates well Chen's argument 
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of elusiveness and the use of modality to achieve that end. 
As a journalist, Jennings is cognizant that he and his 
television network (self) are liable for the accuracy or 
inaccuracy of his statement(s). Moreover, being on-record 
and not desiring to lose face for violating the maxim of 
Quality (i.e., stating as fact that for which one lacks 
sufficient evidence to declare to be true), Jennings 
chooses to distance himself from the truth of his 
proposition by using the modal may rather than baldly 
committing, ~Tanzanite, the popular gem that is funding 
terrorism." Thus, Jennings 1) effectively proposes by 
implication, through the use of modality, a link between 
tanzanite and terrorism, 2) escapes accountability for the 
truthfulness of his proposition, and thereby, 3) preserves 
self-face, i.e., precludes or mitigates other attack 
against self. In sum, following a non-commital politeness 
superstrategy was less self-face threatening than absolute 
commitment in his speech. 
When estimating the weightiness of an FTA, Brown and 
Levinson suggest that the speaker factors three 
sociological variables: social distance, relative power, 
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and the ranking of impositions in the particular culture 
expressed through the following formula: 
Wx=D(S,H)+P(H,S)+Rx. 
In other words, the weight of the face-threatening act x 
equals the social distance (D) of the speaker (S) to the 
hearer (H), plus the relative power (P) of the hearer over 
the speaker, plus the absolute ranking (R) of impositions 
in the particular culture. In this equation, social 
distance is a non-power, horizontal measurement of 
speaker/hearer identity and relationship (friend/friend, 
acquaintance/acquaintance, colleague/colleague, 
parent/parent, etc.), whereas relative power indicates the 
vertical or hierarchical role value of one participant over 
the other (captain/private, employer/employee, 
parent/child, teacher/student, etc.). Additionally, the 
appropriateness of a speech act according to cultural 
expectations for a particular office/occupation, age, 
gender, expertise, etc., is calculated as Rx. 
While we observe that the collective ·addends of the 
previous equation influence politeness, and thus 
commitment, in our speech acts, can we also say that each 
addend independently influences commitment in our speech? 
Further, if one or more do independently affect commitment 
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in our speech, do they affect commitment equally or 
disproportionately? 
As a horizontal measurement of speaker/hearer 
relationship, social distance is a non-power continuum of 
interactive symmetry. Brown and Levinson assert that this 
measurement of symmetrical likenesses and/or contrasts is 
calculated according to "frequency of interaction" and "the 
kinds of material or non-material goods (including face) 
exchanged between Sand H" (p. 77). On one end of the 
spectrum is greater social distance that includes 
speaker/hearer relationships having the least frequency of 
interaction and the greatest contrast of exchanged goods 
(such as might occur between speakers with contrastive 
dialects, ethnic values, ages, occupations, etc.) At the 
opposite end of the continuum, social closeness, 
speaker/hearer relationships have the greatest commonality 
and frequency of exchanges. "The reflex of social 
closeness," Brown and Levinson propose, "is, generally, the 
giving and receiving of positive face" (p. 77). By applying 
the previous reflex principle to commitment in our speech 
(with deference to Chen's unification of positive and 
negative face superstrategies), I propose that speakers of 
greater social distance will tend to utter greater positive 
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and negative SFTA's, taking wide latitude to avoid (even 
not to keep) absolute commitment. In contrast, speakers of 
strong social propinquity will tend to utter (and to keep) 
commitment to other as a face-giving reflex. For example, 
upon my best friend's request, I would be inclined to utter 
absolute commitment, whereas upon the request of an 
acquaintance, I might have greater tendency to decline 
commitment, either baldly or with redress. Thus, I 
hypothesize that social distance, or horizontal 
relationship, does independently influence commitment in 
our speech. 
In addition to horizontal relationships, we also 
observe vertical, or power relationships between 
interlocuters (Brown and Levinson's second addend, P). 
These asymmetrical relationships are based upon "material 
control (over economic distribution and physical force)" 
and "metaphysical control (over the actions of others, by 
virtue of metaphysical forces subscribed to by those 
others)" (p. 77), whether sanctioned or unsanctioned, 
intersecting or non-intersecting. Accordingly, Scollon and 
Scollon (1981) refer to power manifestations among speakers 
as "superordinate" over "subordinate" roles in the 
presentation of self [e.g., elder over younger, teqcher 
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over student, employer over employee, husband over wife 
(traditionally), parent over child, etc.] Moreover, Scollon 
and Scollon assert that the superordinate role entails 
dominance and spectatorship of the subordinate, whereas the 
expectation of the subordinate role is exhibitionism and 
dependence. Therefore, "as S's power over H increases, the 
weightiness of (an) FTA diminishes" (Brown and Levinson, 
p. 78). For as the speaker or superordinate's power· 
increases over the subordinate hearer, so does the· 
dominant's imposition upon and expectation from the hearer, 
e.g. employer/employee relationship. 
Building upon the preceding foundation, I propose that 
as the power of the speaker (superordinate) over the hearer 
(subordinate) increases, so does the weightiness of the 
SFTA to the hearer. Of application to commitment in our 
speech, I hypothesize the following: as the power of the 
speaker requesting commitment increases over the hearer, 
the greater the hearer will tend to make (and to keep) 
absolute commitment. Conversely, however, I ask: would the 
superordinate's-commitment toward the subordinate be the 
same? If not, how would commitment vary? 
Thirdly, Brown and Levinson's politeness equation 
includes the element of cultural significance in our 
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speech. Hudson (1996) asserts a merger between "language" 
and "social constraints on speech" (p. 108). Moreover, he 
maintains, 
Society controls our speech in two ways. Firstly, by 
providing a set of norms. Secondly, society 
provides the motivation for adhering to these 
norms ... In addition to controlling it in these two 
ways, society takes a great interest in speech, and in 
particular provides a set of concepts for thinking and 
talking about it (pp. 119-120). 
Specific to commitment in our speech, cultural norms, as 
referred to by Hudson, constrain explicitness in language. 
For example, Keenan (1974) observes intentional ambiguity 
as a norm in Malagasy society. New information is 
perceived as a peculiar treasure, giving prestige to the 
person who solely possesses it. Thus, specific information 
generally is not provided upon request; rather, an elusive 
response is the norm. Further, the uttering of specific 
identities and references is believed to bring bad omen 
upon that which is specified and "tsiny" guilt upon the 
speaker. The consequence of this belief upon Malagasy 
explicitness is three fold. First, Malagasy speakers avoid 
addressing persons and identifying sources by given name. 
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Second, speakers hesitate to talk specifically about past 
events. Third, speakers are extremely reluctant to utter 
future commitments. In sum, Keenan's research suggests 
that Malagasy speakers seemingly prefer to use non­
committal speech. 
Similarly, Scollon and Scollon (1981) observe 
contrasts between American English and Athabaskan speakers. 
The researchers report that whereas explicitness and 
commitment to past and future events is culturally 
appropriate among American English speakers, Athabaskan 
speech reflects the practice of a Reduction Principle, 
i.e., the reduction of self. Thereby, Athabaskan speakers 
perceive illocutions that directly state or commit to 
future events to be culturally unacceptable, bringing "bad 
luck". Specific favorable recounting of past events is 
also avoided. 
Thus, in light of the previous Malagasy and Athabaskan 
linguistic contrasts to English discourse and given that 
language acquisition theory affirms :the phenomenon of first 
language transfer into second languages (Gass & Selinker, 
2001), I hypothesize that native language influences 
speaker commitment among English speakers. 
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Finally, the merger of cultural constraints and 
language (Hudson, 1996, previously cited) also imposes 
expectations of gender in language. Hudson writes, "As far 
as speakers are concerned, the commonest characteristics to 
be reflected by specific linguistic items is sex" (p. 121). 
Further, he asserts that male speakers are oriented toward 
power. In contrast, female speakers are solidarity 
purposed. Interestingly, the researcher considers the 
motivation of power to disadvantage the male speaker in the 
home where "rapport-speaking" is key to private family 
relationships, and perceives the solidarity motivation of 
the female speaker to be disadvantageous in the workplace 
wherein oral presentations and committee deliberations are 
required. Accordingly, Coates (1986) asserts that men and 
women "differ... in their sense of what is appropriate for 
them as speakers" (p. 123). Citing Lakoff (1975),_ she 
additionally states, "Women are perceived as expressing 
themselves in a more tentative way .than men," i.e. less 
committal (P. 103). 
However, the "tentativeness" of female speech in 
sociolinguistic theory is highly controversial. O'Barr and 
Atkins (1980; cited in Coates, 1986) refute Lakoff's (1975) 
assertion regarding the so-called female tentativeness 
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(modality) in speech. For O'Barr and Atkins observe that 
courtroom speech is influenced by two primary factors: a 
speaker's social status and previous courtroom experience, 
not by gender. As further ·argument against predominate 
tentativeness in female speech, Holmes (1984) reports 
greater modality and mitigation in men's tag questions than 
in women's (see Table 1.2 below). Further, the women's 
sp·eech contains nearly twice the percentage of affective 
tags as the men's. 
Table 1.2. Gender: Tag Questions 
Epistemic Affective Mitigative 
(Modality) 
Men 61% 25% 13% 
Women 35% 59% 6% 
(Holmes, 1984) 
Does, then, gender truly influence tentativeness or, 
contrastively, commitment in our speech? I hypothesize 
that it does, but only for isolated occasions or functions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MODALS: TRUTH AND COMMITMENT 
"There isr perhapsr no area of English grammar that is 
both more important and more difficult than the system 
of modals." (Palmer, 1979, cited in Washingtonr 1991r 
p. 1) 
"Modalityr like negation or questionsr is apparently a 
linguistic universal. One can say that it appears in 
all languages (in different ways) or even that any 
language without it would be 'impossible'. " 
(Washington, 1991, p.1) 
Introduction 
In chapter one, we defined speaker commitment in 
speech acts and examined various influences and constraints 
upon our commitment to our speech. Certainly and 
practically, however, the entirety of our speech is not 
comprised exclusively of absolute commitment. For example, 
consider the following excerpts/citations from the 
historical 2000 Presidential Election campaign speeches and 
debates (Note: italics are my emphasis). George W. Bush 
argued the need to improve education, "We must not leave 
one child behind" (Republican National Convention, 
televised August 3, 2000). He further asserted in the 
first Presidential Debate, "I believe that if we find poor 
children trapped in schools that won't teach, we need to 
free the parents," (New York Times, October 5, 2000) to 
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which Al Gore rebutted, "I don't think private schools 
should have a right to take taxpayer money away from public 
schools." Concerning gun control, Al Gore postured, "None 
of my proposals would have an effect on hunters or people 
who use rifles" (New York Times, October 19, 20001. On the 
issue of medical care Mr. Gore proposed, "I think we ought 
to have a patients' bill of rights." Mr. Bush countered, 
"If I'm the president, we're going to have emergency room 
care, we're going to have gag orders, women will have 
direct access to OB-GYN, people will be able to take their 
insurance company to court" (New York_Times, October 18, 
2000). When questioned regarding the selection of U.S. 
Supreme Court justices Governor Bush declared, "I believe 
in strict constructionists, and those are the kind of 
judges I will appoint." Vice President Gore contested, 
"The constitution ought to be interpreted as a document 
that grows with our country and our history (New York 
Times, October 5, 2000). 
In similar discourse following the election, on 
November 21, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled on 
arguments which hinged upon two words, shall and may, in 
Florida's statutes and election rules. Effectively, the 
Justices ruled unanimously that may in relationship to the 
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discretionary provision of authority granted to Florida's 
Secretary of State supersedes shall referent to Florida's 
Constitutional mandate to certify votes (Hannity and 
Calmes, November 21, 2000). 
Woven throughout the previous rhetorical garment of 
the 2000 Presidential Election is a common grammatical and 
elocutionary thread, modality. Modality is defined as 
"that classification of propositions based on whether they 
assert or deny the possibility, impossibility, contingency, 
or necessity of their content" (American Heritage College 
Dictionary, 1997, p. 876). Rhetorically, modality may be 
expressed in diverse constructions including, but not 
limited to, 1) Core modals and/or semi-auxiliaries, 
2) Lexical verbs (particularly opinion referents), 
3) Adverbs and sentence modifiers, 4) Imperative and/or 
subjunctive moods, 5) Non-linguistic cues, 6) Vocal 
inflection, and 7) Truth-opposition statements such as 
sarcasm, etc. (Berk, 1999; Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman, 
1999; Grice, 1990; Shiffrin, 1990). Thus, it follows that 
modality in the English language is applied multifariously: 
to speculate, hedge, mitigate, predict, .suggest or assert 
advice, mandate, request, and express hopes and/or desires. 
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The focus of this chapter, however, will be narrowed 
in scope to the first of modality constructions listed, 
core modals and semi-auxiliaries such as those highlighted 
in the afore political context. Specifically, I will 
present their identification and meanings/functions 
followed by a pragmatic survey of commitment and truth in 
modal usage in Chapter 3. 
Identification 
We have already observed that modals play an integral 
part in the political context of promises, debate, and law. 
Moreover, Washington (1991) asserts that it is impossible 
to express making plans, predicting future events, or 
creating possible worlds (irrealis) without modals. Thus, 
the question follows, how then can we aptly identify and 
appropriate modals in daily discourse? 
Modals may be divided into two classifications, core 
modals (true modals) and semi-auxiliaries, also referred to 
as phrasal, periphrastic, pseudo and quasi-modals (Berk, 
1999; Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman, 1999; Jacobs, 1995). 
Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman (1999) define core modals as 
"tenseless auxiliaries that take no subject-verb agreement 
and no infinitive to before the following verb" (p. 137). 
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Berk (1999) characterizes these modals as "semantically 
rich and inflectionally impoverished... (they) carry no 
third person present {-s} ending... and they have no past 
participle forms, no present participle forms, and no 
infinitive forms" (p. 132) . 
Core modals traditionally have been divided into two 
forms, those that historically were present tense and their 
historically past tense forms. These terms currently imply 
semantic purpose (to be discussed later) rather than 
standard tense. 
Table 2.1. Core Modals 









Note: [] requires negative and/or interrogative constructions 
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In Table 2.1 above, we observe that the historically past 
tense was constructed by Old English "root vowel 
alternation" (Matthews, 1996, p. 364) and the appendage of 
{-d} or {-t} past tense suffixes to the historical present 
(Berk, 1999). Hence, The historically past tense of shall 
is should and the historically past tense of will is would, 
etc. 
For every core modal there is a phrasal modal (PM) 
counterpart as illustrated in Table 2.2 below. Jacobs 
(1995) refers to these modal counterparts as periphrastic 
modals because they "paraphrase (core) modal meanings" (p. 
217). Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman (1999) best define 
phrasal modals as "multiword forms ending in infinitive to, 
which function semantically like true modals (in certain of 
their meanings)" (p. 138). Berk (1999) adds that such 
modals usually begin with be, carry tense and subject-verb 
agreement (with the exception of used to and had better), 
and allow the present and past participle forms of aspect. 
The tense and subject-verb agreement is inflected on be, 
have, or the head verb (except PM's that have incorporated 
the true modal would). Further, tense and modality may be 
added on the same verb form. Adverbs other than the 
negative not may not separate PM word components. 
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Table 2.2. Modal Counterparts 
Core Phrasal 
shall obliged to 
will be going to, be about to 
may, might be allowed to, be permitted to 
can, could be able to 
must have to, have got to 
should, ought (to) be to, be supposed to 
would (past habit) used to 
Other semi-auxiliaries that have been accepted as modals in 
contemporary English include: be sure to, be bound to, be (un)likely 
to, be certain to, be (un)willing to, be due to, seems to, appears to 
be, need to, want to, had better, had best, would rather, would prefer 
to, and would like to. 
(Berk, 1999; Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman, 1999; and Jacobs, 1995) 
Remarkably, phrasal modals, particularly those ending 
in to, possess a strong enough semantic tie between to and 
the word immediately preceding, that the two words actually 
become one lexical unit in casual daily speech. Thereby, 
have to becomes "hafta," got to becomes "gotta," going to 
converts to "gonna," and need to is often spoken "needsta," 
etc. (Jacobs, 1995) 
Meanings and Functions 
Having identified modals, we turn our attention to 
their meaning and function. Modals present five semantic 
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potentials: 1) alternative state(s) of the subject, 2) 
intimation of time, 3) antithesis of tense, 4) epistemic 
inference, and 5) deontic assertion. First, Washington 
(1991) informs that modals project alternative subject 
states (states that are non-existent at the present place 
and time) that regular verbs do not. Regular verbs present 
the subject of a sentence in its actual state. Further, a 
regular verb limits its subject to only one actual state. 
For example, John is the son of Dr. and Mrs. Larson. The 
former sentence expresses that John, the subject, clearly 
belongs to the Larsons. His belonging to the Larsons is 
his sole actual state. The verb is neither implies or 
allows any other state for John. In contrast, modals can 
imply a representation of many possible alternative subject 
states. For example, John may be the son of Dr. and Mrs. 
Larson. The modal may in this example allows multiple 
alternative states of the subject. For it is possible that 
John is the Larson's son; it is also possible that John is 
not. Moreover, he may be the son of any number of people, 
i.e. the Smith's, the Blake's, the Teller's, etc. 
Not only do modals have the ability to imply possible 
alternative states, but they can also suggest necessary 
alternative states "different from the presentr actual one" 
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(Washington, 1991, p. 4; see also Hinkel, 1995). Consider 
the following sentences: 
(1) Dan and Shelley must make a shopping list before 
going to Albertson's. 
(2) Mary should do her homework. 
Both sentences express the need for a subject state other 
than the present, actual one. In sentence 1, Dan and 
Shelley have not actually made a shopping list. However, 
must suggests a necessary change of state prior to 
shopping, i.e., the making of a shopping list. Sentence 2 
represents Mary's present actual state as not having done 
her homework. Should manifests a necessary, different 
state for Mary, i.e., doing her homework. The suggested 
alternative state also implies alternative outcome(s). For 
example, sentence 2 expresses that Mary's necessary 
alternative state, doing homework, would have different 
results (i.e., better grades, different responses from her 
parents and teacher, etc.) than her present actual state of 
not having done her homework. Conclusively, having 
observed the semantic implications of the possible versus 
the necessary alternative states, "deciding between the 
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possible and necessary," then, is "basic to the way a 
writer (or speaker) chooses to represent the alternate 
state" (Washington, 1991, p. 9). 
In addition to presenting alternative states, modals 
also intimate time--past, present and future--for such 
states. Past modality may be expressed by usage of a modal 
followed by have and a main verb in {-en} or {-ed} past 
participle construction (perfect aspect). For example, Dan 
might have gone home. As previously demonstrated, might 
expresses alternative states for the subject, Dan. 
Additionally, the modal might in conjunction with have gone 
(the present perfect aspect of go) expresses that the 
alternative states of going home or going somewhere else 
occurred in the indefinite past. 
Traditionally, present time has generally been 
indicated by the use of an historic~lly past tense modal 
followed by a bare infinitive (infinitive without to), 
although contemporary English is incorporating historically 
present forms also. Consider the sentence, That could be 
Dan at the door. Again, the modal could suggests 
alternative states for That. Furthermore, historically 
past could followed by the bare infinitive be intimates the 
present tense for those alternative states. For we may 
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insert an adverb of present time and maintain the exact 
sentence meaning: That could be Dan at the door (now). 
The third meaning of time, the future, is expressed by 
the use of an historically present tense modal immediately 
followed by a bare infinitive. In the sentence, Darla will 
have to leave soon in order to get to the library before it 
closes., Darla is not at the library at the present time. 
Will have to presents an alternative state of necessity for 
Darla (i.e., getting to the library before it.closes), 
which if it is actually to take place, will take:place in 
the indefinite future. Thus, we observe that commitment in 
speech acts may include a modal referent to past, present, 
or future time. 
Although we have observed time referents for modality, 
modals are antithetical to regular tensed verbs, 
semantically. For modals uniquely enable the speaker to 
interpose subjective interjections of his/her perception, 
proposition and/or perspective on discourse that the use of 
regular present or past tense verbs does not allow. Modals 
may convey the speaker's attitudes, politeness, indirect 
inferences (such as indirect requests), assertiveness 
(e.g., advice), consent/approval, alternatives to yes or no 
responses, and degree of probability/possibility, 
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certainty, or commitment (Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman, 
1999; Washington, 1991). Contrast the following sentences: 
(3) Sam is an engineer. 
(4) Sam might be an engineer. 
The tense inflected copula in sentence (3) states only 
present fact that Sam's occupation indeed is that of an 
engineer. However, the modal might in sentence (4) 
interjects the speaker's degree of certainty/uncertainty 
that Sam is an engineer. And in so doing, the statement 
moves from a factual account to a proposition of the 
speaker's subjective conjecture, which lacks speaker 
commitment to the proposition as being truth. 
"The ways in which speakers indicate their degree of 
commitment to the truth of a given proposition" is referred 
to as epistemic meaning (Berk, 1999, p. 130). Commitment 
to the truth may take the form of absolute modality 
[Matthews' (1996) poles of necessity, certainty and 
impossibility] or relative modality (degrees of 
possibility, probability and improbability that exist 
between the absolute poles). In the sentence Mike will win 
the race, the modal will expresses the speaker's positive 
assertion of high probability. In contrast, Mike could win 
the race suggests, through the modal could, the speaker's 
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positive assertion of low probability. Relative modality 
between the two degrees of commitment is expressed by 
statements such as Mike should win the race, Mike may win 
the race, and Mike might win the race (from highest to 
lowest probability). Negative assertions of uncertainty, 
improbability and impossibility are stated with the adverb 
not or prefixes such as {un-} and {im-}, as in the phrasal 
modal is unlikely to. The package might not arrive on time 
expresses negative assertion of low possibility. The 
negative assertion of impossibility is stated The package 
can't arrive on time. Modality between these extremes may 
be expressed (from highest to lowest possibility) The 
package may not arrive on time, The package is unlikely to 
arrive on time, and The package won't arrive on time. The 
following model (Table 2.3) is a helpful characterization 
of epistemic usage. 
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Table 2. 3. Epistemic Usages 
may predict. Potentialis subjective relative modality 
concess. potentialis subjective relative modality 
can realis objective relative modality 
will potentialis subjective positive assertion 
must potentialis subjective absolute modality 
have/got to realis objective absolute modality 
might irrealis subjective relative modality 
potentialis subjective -relative modality 
could potentialis/ objective relative modality 
irrealis 
would irrealis (?) positive assertion 
should potentialis subjective -absolute modality 
positive assertion 
ought potentialis objective -modality 
(Matthews, 1996, p. 373) (- =downgraded) 
In contrast to epistemic meaning and function, modals 
may also be used to express deontic meaning (also called 
root modality) by asserting directives or volition for 
potential action. Berk (1999) defines directives as "any 
utterance in which a speaker tries to get someone else to 
behave in a particular way" (p. 131). Examples include 
giving or requesting advice or permission; soliciting 
commitment; and asserting mandate/prohibition, instruction, 
or reprimand. 
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Examples: (6) What should/can I do? (requesting advice) 
(7) You should/could invest in long-term 
options. (giving advice) 
(8) May I leave now? (requesting permission) 
(9) You may take a break. (giving permission) 
(10) Will you go with me? (soliciting commitment) 
(11) You must/will do your homework. (mandate) 
(12) You should circle the correct answer. 
(instruction) 
(13) You should have called. (reprimand) 
Deontic volition encompasses the utterance of commitment 
(agreement or promise), intention (including threats), 
desire, willingness (i.e., making an offer or invitation), 
or preference. 
Examples: (14) I will pick you up at 8:00. (commitment) 
(15) I'm going to keep trying. (intention) 
(16) She would like to order now. (desire) 
(17) I would be happy to help you. (willingness) 
(18) Carla would rather sleep than eat. 
(preference) 
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Matthews (1996) reports the following representation 
of deontic usage (p. 373). 
Table 2. 4. Deontic Usages 
may potentialis subjective relative modality 
can realis objective relative modality 
must potentialis subjective absolute modality 
shall * potentialis subjective absolute modality 
potentialis subjective positive assertion 
will potentialis objective positive assertion 
have/got to realis objective absolute modality 
might irrealis subjective relative modality 
could irrealis objective relative modality 
should potentialis subjective -absolute modality 
irrealis subjective .-absolute modality 
ought (to) potentialis objective -absolute modality 
(* used deontically only) (- =downgraded) 
As a noteworthy exception to Matthew's representation 
(Figure 2.4), not only does will imply positive assertion, 
will also carries meaning of absolute modality. Coates 
(1983) attributes meanings of intention and willingness to 
deontic, volitional will. Jacobs (1995) also asserts, 
"will indicates intentionr" and continues, "Intention is 
the imposition upon 'oneself' of an obligation to take some 
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I action" (P. 227). For example, Will you marry me? Yes, 
will marry you. As (self or other) imposed obligation, 
i.e., promise or commitment, will is absolute modality. 
Lastly, in the discussion of meanings/functions of 
modals, consideration is given to the contrastive function 
of modals in quoted versus reported speech. Historically 
present modals are used to quote actual speech of others 
for the purpose of preserving the speech integrity 
(perception, propositional intent, and/or perspective) of 
the one being quoted (Berk, 1999; Celce-Murcia & Larsen-
Freeman, 1999; Matthews, 1996). For example, Miss Reeves 
said, "I will collect your assignment at the beginning of 
class tomorrow." Herein, the quoter commits him/herself to 
a representation of truth to the other's speech. 
Contrastively, modals that were historically past 
tense, are applied to reported speech (Berk, 1999; Celce­
Murcia & Larsen-Freeman, 1999; Matthews, 1996). The 
speaker chooses to assign reported speech to another's 
discourse in order to create a means through which he/she 
may interpose his/her personal opinion, emotion, and 
inferences about the other's speech. Reported speech, 
then, is relayed in the form David told me that he would 
help if he weren't too busy on Monday. We may observe from 
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this example that reported speech allows the reporter 1) to 
distance him/herself from a commitment to truth of the 
other's speech and 2) to incorporate relativity and 





In a televised discussion with Fox News host Tony Snow 
(November 25, 2000), regarding the ongoing Presidential 
contest, Jim Pinkerton of Newsday compared current American 
values to Einstein's "Theory of Relativity." He states, 
"There are no absolutes! . . . The relative of the 
circumstance and the moment dictates the truth." Having 
contemplated Mr. Pinkerton's statement, I ponder whether 
his assertion regarding current American values might 
accurately reflect our spoken American English language 
with particular respect to modal usage. Accordingly, ·as an 
experiment of research to investigate propositional truth 
and commitment in modal usage, I pose the following 
questions for survey: 
1. Do speakers· express absolute commitment through-
modal usage? If culture is reflected in language 
(Hinkel, 1995), do Matthew's (1996) poles of 
absolute modality and Celce-Murcia & µarsen­
Freeman's (1999) modal commitment to certainty 
remain? 
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2. What modals do speakers perceive to convey the 
strongest and weakest degree/meanings of commitment? 
3. Do speakers prefer the directness of the positive 
assertion can or the distancing, yet polite form 
could when speaking commitment? 
4. Does the usage of can versus could change the 
degree/meaning of a speaker's commitment in speech? 
5. How do speakers' perceptions of commitment through 
the use of the modal will relate to relationships 
between speakers and hearers? 
6. Are age, gender, occupationr ·and/o~ native language 
relational to the degree and/or propositional truth 
of commitment in speech? 
7. Are speakers' perceptions of their level of 
commitments consistent with or variant to their 
reported actual keeping of commitments? 
8. Do speakers use the phrasal modal need to 




As a medium to acquire unprejudiced data, a 16 
question written survey, primarily multiple choice, was 
created. (See Appendix A) In an effort not to bias or 
limit speakers' preference, in each of the multiple choice 
survey questions respondents are asked whether they prefer 
to say other/write in, as well as to write the reason for 
their stated preference. To elicit an answer to research 
question 1, Do speakers use modals to express absolute 
commitment?, the survey's multiple-choice questions offer 
the following options: absolute commitment, relative 
degrees of commitment between absolute commitment and non­
commitment, and other/write in (Exception: these options. 
are non-applicable to multiple-choice question #13). In 
order to observe which modals speakers perceive to convey 
the strongest and weakest degrees/meanings of commitment 
(research question 2), survey questions #1 and 7 ask the 
respondents to rate modals from the strongest to the 
weakest meaning of commitment as they would use the modals 
in daily speech. To inquire whether speakers prefer to 
utter commitment by direct assertion or polite distancing 
(research question 3), survey question #3 directly asks 
respondents their preference for saying can or could when 
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speaking commitment. Survey questions #5 and 10 are 
devoted to answering research question 4 with respect to 
the respondent's intended degree/meaning of commitment 
through the use of can versus could in daily conversation. 
Survey question #5 asks the respondents what degree of 
commitment they mean when saying I can help you tomorrow; 
likewise survey question #10 asks the respondents what 
degree of commitment they mean when saying I could help you 
tomorrow. In effort to answer research question 5, How do 
speakers' perceptions of commitment.through the use of the 
modal "will" relate to relationships between speakers and 
hearers, survey questions #2, 6, 8, and 11 ask the 
respondents what they mean when saying I will do it 
respectively to an employer, employee, friend or co-worker, 
and casual acquaintance. Survey question #15 directly asks 
respondents their age, gender, occupation, and native 
language; responses have been crosstabbed against each 
responses to each question in the survey in order to answer 
research question 6, Are age, gender, occupation, and/or 
native language relational to the degree and/or 
propositional truth of commitment in speech. In an attempt 
to evaluate whether speakers' perceptions of their level of 
commitments are consistent with or variant to their 
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reported actual keeping of commitments (research question 
7), survey questions #12, 14, and 16 respectively ask 
respondents whether in the past year they have uttered 
commitment but failed to keep their commitment, the 
frequency that they utter commitment but fail to keep their 
commitment, and the degree of commitment that they prefer 
to make. The responses to survey questions #12, 14, and 16 
are compared/contrasted. Finally, the aim of research 
question 8 was to observe whether need to is consistently 
spoken with the literal intended meaning of necessity; 
accordingly, survey question #9 asks respondents what they 
meant by need to the last time they told their employer 
that they needed to take time off. The survey was reviewed 
by two California State University (San Bernardino, CA) 
English professors and graduate peers prior to distribution 
to the public. 
A total of sixty-eight persons were surveyed; of the 
sixty-eight surveys returned, three were incomplete and 
were necessarily set aside. Thus, the percentages and 
numbers of this report are based on a total population of 
65 persons. This population is defined by the following: 
43% ages 18-25, 37% ages 26-45, 19% ages 46 or older; 40% 
male and 60% female; non-native English speakers 19% (1.5% 
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Chech, 3% Spanish, 3% Korean, 1.5% Japanese, 5% Chinese, 
1.5% Russian, 1.5% Vietnamese). Three percent declined to 
answer native language. 
Sampling of five populations and/or sites was chosen 
in an attempt to gather an honest, integrous representation 
of the general public. Sites selected for survey include 
Wal-mart's main exit (Hemet, CA; 17 persons surveyed) and 
California State University's Student Commons (20 persons 
surveyed) and University Hall (10 persons surveyed). 
Persons surveyed at the Student Commons and University Hall 
are of diverse majors/disciplines other than English. 
Additional respondents include acquaintances and friends 
(non-university, 6 persons surveyed) and volunteers of a 
graduate multilingual English class (12 persons surveyed) 
These volunteers are English proficient, but have not been 
biased by classroom instruction specific to modals. 
Surveys were distributed and collected by myself; 
there were no intermediaries. Respondents completed the 
surveys in my presence at the time of distribution to them. 
Further, individuals did not collaborate or discuss the 
questions with others. 
Findings were hand calculated twice for accuracy. 
Additionally, statistical frequencies and Pearson chi-
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square cross tab probabilities (seeking P=0.05 or less) 
were tabulated using SPSS 10.0 application. 
Findings 
To test the respondents' perceptions of which modals 
convey the strongest and weakest degree/meanings of 
commitment, question one of the survey asks participants to 
rate the modals can, will, and may, in the order of 
probability and/or commitment as the participant would use 
them in daily conversation. In Table 3.1 below, we notice 
that greater than three-fourths of the surveyed population 
perceive will as meaning the strongest commitment of the 
three modals, which is consistent with Celce-Murcia & 
Larsen-Freeman (1999) and Jacobs (1995). 
However, we observe particular disparity with regard 
to can. Whereas Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman and Jacob$ 
ascribe greater certainty to may over can, three-fifths of 
the surveyed participants attribute greater certainty to 
can over may. Moreover, an unexpected 20.6% of the 
participants evaluate can as communicating stronger 
commitment than will. 
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Table 3 .1. Commitment Strength I 
Strongest Mid Weakest 
Frequency Valid % Frequency Valid % Frequency Valid % 
Will 47 77 .0% 9 14.8% 5 8.2% 
Can 13 20.6% 39 61.9% 11 17.5% 
May 6 9. 7% 12 19.4% 44 71.0% 
Further, with respect to can and in response to question #5 
of the survey, When saying, "I 'can' help you tomorrow," 
what do you mean?, an overwhelming 69.2% replied absolute 
commitment, rather than probable or possible commitment. 
Moreover, in question #3, participants were asked 
their preferences for saying can or could in daily 
conversation. Deference (nearly 70%) was given to the 
directness of the positive assertion I can over the 
distant, albeit polite form, I could (10.8%). [The 
remaining participants answered other.] However, in answer 
to question 10, When saying, "I 'could' help you tomorrow, rr 
what do you mean?, forty percent still indicated absolute 
commitment, as opposed to lesser commitment. 
Desiring to be cautious about generalizations, I 
question whether the divergence of can from published 
theory and grammar texts is an isolated movement among 
survey participants or whether the disparity would extend 
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beyond the population surveyed. Future study of the modal 
may be warranted to determine if there is a moving trend 
from weak to strong commitment in the practical meaning and 
usage of can. 
To further test the respondents' perceptions of which 
modals convey the strongest and weakest degree of 
commitment in speech, question #7 of the survey was set 
forth. Similar to question #1 (previously discussed), 
participants were asked to rate the modals could, should, 
might, ought, and must from strongest to weakest 
probability and commitment used in their daily language. 
In Table 3.2 below, we first observe discordant use of 
must. The majority (55.2%) of respondents use must in 
their daily speech as the strongest commitment modal among 
the five. On the other hand, must also is used as the 
weakest modal by approximately one-third (32.8%) of the 
participants surveyed. Second, reiterating the 
unanticipated strength of can, nearly one-fourth (23.3%) 
surveyed use could, the historically past tense of can, as 
meaning stronger commitment than must. In fact, nearly 75% 
of respondents use can (the modal to which weakness is 
theoretically attributed) to mean mid to strongest 
certainty and commitment of the five modals. Whereas half 
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(51.7%) of the respondents use should for speaking strong 
self-commitment (slightly less than .the absolute· certainty 
attributed to must), 25% use can for stronger commitment 
than should. Fourth, ought is congruently spoken as mid to 
weak commitment. Lastly, the most frequent (nearly 75%) 
use of might is equably spread throughout the mid to 
weakest end of the continuum. 
Table 3.2. Commitment Strength II 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongest Strong Mid Weak Weakest 
F VP F VP F VP F VP F VP 
Must 32 55.2% 4 6.9% 2 3.4% 1 1. 7% 19 32.8% 
Could 14 23.3% 15 25. 0% 14 23.3% 9 15.0% 8 13.3% 
Might 9 15.0% 9 15.0% 13 21.7% 15 25. 0% 14 23.3% 
Should 5 8.6% 30 51.7% 14 24.1% 8 13.8% 1 1. 7% 
Ought 2 3.4% 7 12.1% 19 32.8% 23 39.7% 7 12.1% 
In comparison, Jacobs (1995) and Celce-Murcia & Larsen­
Freeman (1999) suggest the following parallel continuums 
(Table 3.3 below) for the previous modals, attributing 
strongest commitment and certainty to must, and conversely, 
weakest commitment to could (can) and might. 
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Table 3.3. Theoretical Commitment Strength 
Celce-Murcia & 
Jacobs Larsen-Freeman 
Strongest High Certainty 
Must Must 
Should Should, ought 
Ought Could, might 
Could Low Certainty 
Might 
Weakest 
Having reviewed the participants' stated evaluation of 
modals as they pertain to probability and commitment in 
their daily speech, we now turn our attention to survey 
questions #2, 6, 8, and 11 to examine any relationships 
between commitment and speaker/hearer relationship. Table 
3.4 on the following page illustrates the diverse speaker 
commitment toward hearers of four differing relationships 
with the speaker: employer, co-worker/friend, family, and 
casual acquaintance. The results were obtained by asking 
What do you mean by "I will?" when speaking to persons of 
each relationship. In the speech of 55% of participants 
surveyed, commitment is affected by speaker/addressee 
relationship. 
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Table 3.4. Relationship Correlation 
Q2 Q6 QB Qll 
To Employer 
To Friend/ 
Co-worker To Family 
To Casual 
Acquaintance 
F VP F VP F VP F VP 
Absolute 43 67.2% 38 58.5% 37 56.9 27 41. 5% 
Commitment, 
providing... 20 31. 3% 26 40.0% 21 32.3% 23 35.4% 
Probable 0 0.0% 1 1.5% 5 7. 7% 7 10.8% 
Possible 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 3.1% 8 12.3% 
Other 1 1. 6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Table 3.4 above suggests a decline of absolute commitment 
as the relationship between speaker and addressee becomes 
more familiar and less power oriented. First, we observe 
that the greatest frequency (67.2%) of absolute commitment 
occurs in the vertical, power relationship of an employee 
(subordinate) speaking to an employer (superordinate). We 
also note the absence of relative (i.e., probable and 
possible) commitment to the employer. Comparatively, 
absolute commitment spoken to a friend/co-worker, declines 
by nearly ten percent--from a percentage of 67% (to 
employer) to 58.5% (to friend/co-worker), whereas frequency 
of provisional commitment to a friend/co-worker 
reciprocally increases by approximately the same percentage 
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from 31.3% (to employer) to 40% (to friend/co-worker) 
Thus, among the surveyed participants, we observe a 
relationship between power and speaker commitment. 
Additionally, a link between speaker commitment and 
horizontal, powerless relationships is notable among survey 
participants. Absolute commitment to addressees with whom 
the speaker has more frequent and intimate interaction 
and/or exchange (i.e., family, friends/co-workers) exceeds 
absolute commitment to socially distanced acquaintances by 
greater than 15%. Curiously, a greater frequency of 
tentative, provisional commitment is meant when speaking to 
friends/co-workers (40.0%) and casual acquaintances (35.4%) 
than when speaking to family members(32.3%). Also, 
commitment meanings of lesser degree, i.e., probable and 
possible, are intended when speaking to family and 
acquaintances; however, probable and possible commitments 
are essentially non-intended when speaking to friends/co­
workers and employers. 
In the previous par~graphs, we have discriminated the 
types of commitments spoken by respondents. However, do 
these speakers of English utter commitment truthfully? Do 
they keep their commitments? In answer to question 12 of 
the survey, nearly 75% admit to having broken commitments 
62 
spoken in the past year. (Note: One could reasonably argue 
an interpretive flexibility of 5% for unforeseen, 
uncontrollable events that might truly preclude a person 
from keeping a commitment.) When asked in question #13 to 
whom did you not keep your cornrnitment(s), the greatest 
percentage was to family and friends, i.e., the more 
intimate relationships. On the other hand, power 
relationships in the workplace have the least frequency of 
broken commitments, of which, the percentage to employers 
is slightly higher than to employees. See Table 3.5 below. 
Table 3.5. Broken Comrnitment(s) To Whom? 
F VP 
To family member 27 42.2% 
To friend 22 34.4% 
To acquaintance 21 32.8% 
To co-worker 11 17.2% 
To Employer 7 10.9% 
To Employee 4 6.3% 
To compare and contrast participants' perception of 
the degree/meaning of their spoken commitments against the 
actual degree/meaning of respondents' spoken commitments, 
two additional questions were asked: question 14, What is 
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I 
the frequency that you tell someone "I will r ,,,, but do not 
carry out the action? and question 16, Which (kind of 
commitment) do you generally prefer to make? An astounding 
77.8% of participants state that they rarely break a spoken 
"will,,,, commitment (although 75% previously disclosed 
their actually having broken an I "will,,,, commitment 
recently); 4.8% assert never. In comparison, nearly 70% of 
persons surveyed indicate their preference to make definite 
commitments, whereas 25% prefer to commit tentatively. 
Interestingly, approximately 5% state a preference for 
speaking no commitment(s). 
Finally, we turn our attention to observe four 
variables age, gender, occupation, and native language in 
relation to commitment in speech. Each variable has been 
cross-tabbed throughout the survey to explore correlation, 
if any, between the variable and spoken commitment among 
the population surveyed. 
Pearson chi-sguare testing indicates correlation 
between age range and the meaning/degree of commitment(s) 
spoken to employers and co-workers. First, we observe 
Table 3.6 below. When saying I will to an employer, nearly 
83% of respondents in the age range 26-45 and 77% in the 
age range 46+ mean absolute commitment. Contrastively, 
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participants ages 18-25 intend nearly equal absolute (48%) 
and provisional (52%) commitment to their employers. 
Table 3.6. Age Range: Spoken Commitment To Employer 
N=63 P=.015 
Ages 18-25 Ages 26-45 Ages 46+ 
N=27 N=23 N=l3 
F VP F VP F VP 
Absolute 13 48.1% 19 82.6% 10 76.9% 
Commitment, 
providing... 14 51. 9% 4 17.4% 2 15.4% 
Other 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 7. 7% 
Also significant, when saying I will to co-workers, 
approximately 70% of respondents in the age ranges of 26-45 
and 46+ mean absolute commitment, compared to 39% of those 
ages 18-25, who intend absolute commitment and nearly 60% 
who mean relative commitment. (See Table 3.7 below.) 
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Table 3.7. Age Range: Spoken Commitment To Co-worker 
N=64 P=.018 
Ages 18-25 Ages 26-45 Ages 46+ 
N=28 N=23 N=13 
F VP F VP F VP 
Absolute 11 39.2% 17 73.9% 9 69.2% 
Commitment, 
providing... 17 60. 7% 6 26.0% 3 23.0% 
Probable 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 7. 7% 
Second, age range is related to commitment kept to 
friends: As Table 3.8 below illustrates, the percentage of 
failed commitment declines as age range increases. 
Table 3.8. Age Range: Failed Commitment(s) To Friends 
N=63 P=. 01 
Ages 18-25 Ages 26-45 Ages 46+ 
N=28 N=23 N=l2 
F VP F VP F VP 
14 50.0% 8 34.8% 0 0.0% 
In addition to age range, responses to question 10 of 
the survey suggest that a relationship exists between 
gender and commitment when using the "polite" modal could 
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(See Table 3.9 below). When saying, I could help you 
tomorrow, approximately 50% of the females surveyed mean 
absolute commitment. Contrastively, only 25% of the males 
speak with the same intended meaning. 




F VP F VP 
You can count on my help. 6 25.0% 20 48.8% 
My help is probable. 2 8.3% 8 19.5% 
My help is possible. 9 37.5% 8 19.5% 
I'm considering helping you. 2 8.3% 3 7.3% 
I'm saying this to appease you. 4 16. 7% 0 0.0% 
Other 1 4.2% 2 4.9% 
Second, the intended meaning of stated commitments is 
congruent between male and female; however, the consistency 
between the females' perception of keeping commitments and 
their reported actual fulfillment of commitments is greater 
than that of males, whose perception of keeping their 
commitments is higher than their reported actual keeping of 
commitments. In Table 3.10 below, we find in response to 
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question 12 that nearly 80% of men surveyed admit to having 
broken a spoken commitment in the past year. 




F VP F VP 
19 79.2% 28 70.0% 
However, in the following table (3.11), we observe 
that over 91% percent of males state that they never or 
rarely break a spoken commitment. In contrast, 70% of 
females surveyed admit to saying, "I will," in the past 
year, but did not keep the commitment (Table 3.10 above), 
which is closely consistent with 77.5% of females stating 
that they rarely say, "I will," but do not keep the 
commitment (Table 3.11 below). Interestingly though, no 
female respondents report never saying, "I will," but not 
keeping the commitment. 
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F VP F VP 
Never 3 13.0% 0 0.0% 
Rarely 18 78.3% 31 77.5% 
Occasionally 1 4.3% 5 12.5% 
50% of time 1 4.3% 3 7.5% 
Often (Greater 
than 50% of time) 0 0.0% 1 2.5% 
A third variable, native language, seemingly 
influences the keeping of commitment to casual acquaintance 
among respondents. Table 3.12 below illustrates that 
whereas 75% of native English speaking respondents reported 
keeping spoken commitments to acquaintances in the previous 
year, only 42% of non-native English speaking respondents 
did so. (Note: The number of non-English speaking 
respondents totaled 12 or one-fifth of the respondents 
surveyed, a small, yet valid sample.) Variances in 
commitments to other relationships and modal meanings were 
not significant. 
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Table 3.12. Native Language: Commitments To Acquaintances 
N=60 P=.026 
Native Ss of English Non-native Ss of English 
N=48 N=l2 
F VP F VP 
Kept 36 75.0% 5 41. 7% 
Broken 12 25.0% 7 58.3% 
Fourth, no notable correlation between occupation and 
commitment in speech is observed; rather, strong 
correlation occurs between vertical, power relationships 
and participants' commitments as previously discussed. 
Finally, we observe among respondents a divergence 
from a commitment to truth with regard to the literal, 
spoken usage of need to. Table 3.13 below illustrates that 
when last saying to employer, "I need to take time off," 
only 52.3% of the respondents meant necessity, whereas 40% 
last used the modal to mean desire or want. Subsequent 
studies would be required to determine if the afore 
findings would extend beyond the present population and/or 
demographics. 
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(health, death, etc.) 34 52.3% 
Desired a break 
(day off or vacation) 18 27. 7% 
Wanted to go elsewhere 
(e.g., to a ballgame) 8 12.3% 
Other 5 7.7% 
Summary 
Operatively, among a small majority (56%) of 
respondents, speaking and intending absolute commitment is 
a norm. The reciprocal, however, is that the meaning of 
will as a positively asserted absolute pole or a commitment 
to certainty has diminished to relative commitment· 
(provisional, probable, possible, and other) among 44% of 
respondents surveyed. The intended degree/meaning of 
spoken commitment of 55% of respondents surveyed is 
affected by the relationship between the respondent and 
his/her hearer. Moreover, a vast discrepancy exists between 
the stated meaning/degree of commitment and the actual 
reported keeping of commitment. The stated preference of 
commitment type is congruent to the stated degree/meaning 
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of commitment to an employer only. Notwithstanding, 
incongruity appears between the respondents' perception of 
their keeping commitments and their reported actual 
reported fulfillment of commitments. (Conceivably, 
however, it is possible to break a commitment once in a 
year and accurately report rarely failing to keep one's 
commitments . ) 
We have observed through a study of variables that age 
range plays a significant role in both the degree/meaning 
of commitments expressed through the modal will .and the 
respondents' perceptions of their actual keeping_of 
commitments. Adults over the age of 26 demonstrate a 
higher degree/meaning of commitments through the modal 
will. Further, the frequency of commitments spoken and kept 
to a friend increases as age range increases. 
Gender is a limited imposing variable. The 
intended meaning of stated commitments expressed through 
the modal will is congruent between male and female. 
However, when using the "polite," former past tense of can, 
i.e., could, the majority of females intend absolute 
commitment, whereas the greater majority of males intend 
relative commitment. Additionally, the consistency between 
the females' perception of keeping commitments and their 
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reported actual fulfillment of commitments is greater than 
that of males, whose perception of their keeping 
commitments is higher than their actual keeping of 
commitments. (As previously noted: conceivably, it is 
possible to break a commitment once in a year and 
accurately report rarely failing to keep one's 
commitments.) 
With respect to the modal will, correlation is noted 
between native language and the respondents' reported 
keeping of commitments to acquaintances, although sampling 
is small. Whereas a greater majority of native English 
speaking participants reported keeping their commitments to 
acquaintances in the previous year, approximately the same 
percentage of non-native English speaking respondents 
reported their not keeping spoken commitments to casual 
acquaintances. 
Occupation as a correlation variable has proven 
insignificant in this study. 
However, relationships, power-oriented and social, 
draw considerable correlation with higher intended 
degree/meaning of commitments in speech as well as with a 
greater frequency of commitments kept. 
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The most striking find of the present research is the 
divergence of the respondents' daily usage of can from 
published theory and grammar texts. Almost one-fourth of 
persons surveyed use can as the strongest modal of speaker 
commitment; in other words, respondents employ its usage to 
mean stronger speaker commitment than will. Additionally, 
could, the modal that historically was the past tense of 
can, is used by nearly 25% of respondents to mean stronger 
speaker commitment than must. Further, approximately 70% 
of respondents mean mid to strongest commitment when they 
say, "I could." Desiring to be cautious about 
generalizations, I question whether this divergence of the 
meaning of can and its former past tense could from 
published theory and grammar texts is an isolated movement 
among survey participants, or whether the disparity extends 
beyond the surveyed population. Further study of can and 
could is warranted. 
Discussion 
General 
In the introduction of the present thesis, two 
questions were posed: 1) If we as speakers of English 
circumvent commitment to the propositional truth in our 
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speech, do we genuinely practice speaking cooperatively 1·n 
mutual commitment to truth? and 2) If we speak commitmen 
but do not intend commitment, do we subtly speak lies? 
Moreover, we have discussed Grice's Co-operative Princi~le 
which states that conversation requires three co-operat~ve 
elements: co-operative effort(s), common purpose (s), and 
mutually accepted direction between speaker(s) and 
hearer(s). Further, the Co-operative Principle includes a 
supermaxim of Quality which state~, "make your ~ontribulion 
one that is true . Do not say what you believe to bl 
false" and "Do not say that for which you lack adequate 
evidence" (Grice, 1990). Therefore, speakers engaged in 
discourse assume mutually co-operative truth in exchangrd 
utterances. The findings of this survey, however, reflect 
daily conversation that is contrary to the principles of 
co-operative truth. In fact, 75% of those surveyed a it 
to having spoken commitment in the last year, but not 
having .kept it; 55% indicate that although they say I ill 
(the modal to which absolute commitment is ascribed in 
modern theory), their intended meaning/degree (and 
consequently, propositional truth) of their spoken 
commitment(s) changes (without indication to the heareT) 
according to their relationship with the addressee. Tlus, 
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we must acknowledge that we as speakers of English d~ not 
always demonstrate co-operative truth in our speech. Our 
individual speaker strategies, which are influenced and/or 
motivated by self or other-politeness, age, gender, Jative 
I 
language/culture, and speaker-hearer relationship, \ 
seemingly lead us to variable effort(s), diverse purprse(s) 
and divergent direction(s). We speak one thing, yet we 
I 
intend another meaning. However, the addressee hears the 
actual spoken word(s) and expects propositional truthi and 
thus, the fulfillment of that commitment which is spolen. 
In addition to a divergence from co-operative trjth, 
we observe discrepancies among respondents in modal 
meanings used in daily conversation. The two greatest 
examples in the survey findings are can and must. Although 
77% of respondents use will as the strongest modal of 
commitment (among can, will, and may), more than 20% use 
can to mean strongest commitment. Of the modals must, 
could, might, should, and ought, only 55% use must to 
indicate strongest commitment, while nearly 33% use mu\t to 
mean weakest commitment. Therefore, it is pragmaticall!Y 
conceivable in daily conversation that a speaker may usl 
can as a modal of relative commitment, yet the hearer 
encodes can to mean absolute commitment, and so the 
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reciprocal (See Table 3.1). Likewise, a speaker may say 
must meaning strongest commitment while the hearer encJdes 
must as weakest commitment (see Table 3.2). In such 
instances we would observe miscommunication rather than co-
operative speech. Thus, sociolinguistically, implications 
for potential interpersonal and interethnic conflict become 
numerous if we cannot commonly discern whether a statemknt 
such as I will. .. is meant to be absolute or relative 
commitment. 
Teaching English as a 
Second Language 
Why should a study of modality and the avoidance of 
absolute commitment in speech acts be important to 
pedagogy, particularly to TESL? Palmer (1979) states, 
"There is, perhaps, no area of English grammar that is l:::loth 
more important and more difficult than the system of 
modals" (cited in Washington, 1991, p.1). Further, 
Washington (1991) proposes, "Modality [i.e., 'that 
classification of propositions based on whether they assert 
or deny the possibility, impossibility, contingency, or 
necessity of their content' (American Heritage College 
Dictionary, 1997, p. 876)], like negation or questions, is 
apparently a linguistic universal. One can say that it 
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appears in all languages (in different ways) or even that 
any language without it would be 'impossible'" (p.1). 
Pragmatically, in the common workplace, which includes both 
. \ 
native and non-native speakers of English, Willing (1\97) 
asserts that "modality is a crucially important enabling 
I 
competence," particularly for problem solving; howevet, his 
I
study finds that non-native speakers "tended very often to 
be less sharply articulated than they could have been, due 
in large part to only rudimentary control of the indioators 
of modality" (p. 33). Thus, the need for second lang age 
learners' acquisition of modals is compelling. 
Specific to modal acquisition, Linnell (1991), in her 
study of non-instructed versus instructed non-native 
speakers of English finds that ESL instruction is 
significant to the acquisition of complex grammars, 
specifically modals; instruction proved remarkably more 
effective than interaction. However, she asserts_ that ESL 
texts present a pragmatic instructional problem: current 
texts give grammatical instruction, but fail. to· includJ 
sociolinguistic appropriateness of grammatical structures 
such as modals. Hinkel (1995) also addresses the probl\m 
of sociolinguistic application and context. Citing Kasp~r 
(1997) Hinkel states, "German students of English are nit 
78 
always aware of modality as a pragmatic category and oftien 
translate modal verb meanings from German into English 
without accounting for their differing contextual 
implication" (P. 326). 
While I concur with the previous theorists and do not 
I 
wish to minimize their concern, the present study may 
\ 
reflect (pending additional research and demographics) a 
more basic challenge for pedagogy: textbook modal meaning 
versus current practical daily usage of modals. If spokeJ 
words of commitment such as I will ... are sometimes 
uttered to mean absolute commitment, yet at other times a e 
intended to mean relative commitment, which model of 
speaker commitment will we set forth to students in the 
classroom - absolute or relative commitment? In practical 
daily application, which will we teach ESL students to 
enable them to express their own volition, intentions, and 
self-obligated commitments? How will we teach our student\s 
to discriminate whether absolute or relative commitment is 
intended by other? 
In further pedagogical consideration, we observe that 
the semantics of modals differ greatly from other 
grammatical structures such as nouns, verbs, articles, and 
conjunctions, etc. which have commonly accepted, specific 
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I the 
speaker and the hearer as a general rule bear in min\ a 
common schemata or definition of the noun. We know tihat a 
house consists of a floor, walls, a roof, window(s), lnd 
and/or dedicated meanings. If I say the word house, 
Idoor(s); additionally, we commonly encode that it is a 
dwelling place for people (unless specified for dogs lr 
I 
birds). Likewise, a verb suggests a particular, defi~ite 
t· t t f b . t· 1 d' . . t \ac ion ors a e o eing. An ar ice iscrimina es noluns. 
A conjunction indicates defined co-ordination or 
subordination. On the other hand, modals -- unlike ady 
other part of speech -- represent a continuum of degree, 
subjectivity and values, speaker intent, circumstance(s), 
and consequently, meaning. Thus, I ask, Whose continulm do 
modals represent? The speaker's? The hearer's? The 
grammarian's? Although current grammar texts suggest a 
standard continuum for modals, the present research 
indicates that respondents employ variant continuums 1) 
amongst themselves and 2) with particular disparity to 
recent grammar texts. At this juncture, advocates for a 
"textless" TESL classroom foreseeably might use the prelent 
research to argue against the accuracy, relevancy, and 
therefore, effectiveness of grammar text usage. However, 
before the pendulum is swung far left, I ask, without a 
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I 
standard of common meaning (such as in grammar texts) ~an 
we teach co-operative discourse? Moreover, I ponder 
whether the absence of grammar texts in many classrooms 
\during the past two and a half decades (survey age range 
18-25) has contributed to the inconsistency of modal 







1. Please rate the following in order of probability 
and/or commitment that you would mean when speaking. 
(strongest=l, weakest=3. If any mean the same td 
you, please mark them with the same number.) 
I can attend the event. 
I will attend the event. 
I may attend the event. 
2. When saying to your employer, "I will do it," what 
do you mean by "I will"? (Please circle one.) 
a. Absolute binding commitment 
b. Commitment, providing other circumstances do not 
arise 
c. A probable commitment 
d. Other 
3. Which do you prefer to say in daily conversation? 
a. I can help you. 
b. I could h~lp you. 
c. Other 
4. Why do you prefer the above choice? 
5. When saying, "I can help you 
mean? (Please circle one.) 





You can count on my help. 
My help is probable. 
My help is possible. 
I'm considering helping you. 
e. I'm saying this to appe~se·you at the moment, but 










When saying to a family member, "I will do it)" what 
do you mean by "I will"? (Please circle one.) 
a. Absolute binding commitment 
1b. Commitment, providing other circumstances do not 
arise 
c. A probable commitment 
d. A possible commitment 
e. Other 
Please rate the following in order of probability 
and/or commitment that you would mean when spe1king. 
(strongest=l, weakest=5. If any mean the same to 
you, please rate them with the same number.) 
I could attend the event. 
I should be able to attend the event. 
I might attend the event. 
I ought to be able to attend the event. 
I must attend the event. 
When saying to a friend or co-worker, "I will do 
it," what do you mean by "I will"? (Please cir~le 
one.) \ 
a. Absolute binding commitment 
b. Commitment, providing other circumstances do not 
arise 
c. A probable commitment 
d. A possible commitment 
e. Other
---------------------------'--
The last time that you told your employer that ybu 
"needed t_o take time off," what did you mean? 
(Please circle one.) 
a. Other circumstance(s), such as health or a death, 
necessitated time away from the job. \ 
b. You desired a break (day off or vacation) from 
the job. \ 
c. You wanted to go elsewhere (e.g. to a ball game) 
d. Other \ 
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10. When saying, "I could help you tomorrow," what do 
you mean? (Please circle one.) 
a. You can count on my help. 
b. My help is probable. 
c. My help is possible. 
d. I'm considering helping you. 
e. I'm saying this to appease you at the moment\ but 
I really don't want or intend to help. 
f. Other 
11. When saying to a casual acquaintance, "I will do 
it," what do you mean by "I will"? 
a. Absolute binding commitment 
b. Commitment, providing other circumstances do nDt 
arise \ 
c. A probable commitment \ 
d. A po s_s_i_b_l_e__c_o_mm_i_·_t_m_e_n_t ______________ \e. Other 
12. Have you in the past year told anyone "I will," 
did not carry out the action? YES/NO (Please btl\t 
circle your answer.) 
13. If your answer was YES, to whom did you say "I \ 
will," but did not carry out the action? (Please 
circle all that apply.) 







14. What is the frequency that you tell someone "I 





d. 50% of the time 
e. Often (greater than 50% of the time) 
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15. What is your age? 
Occupation? 
-
Sex? Male or Female 
Native language? 
16. Which do you generally prefer to make? (Please
circle one.) 
a. Definite commitments 
b. Tentative commitments 
c. Indefinite commitments 
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